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abstract
The emergence of novelty is a ubiquitous feature in science, technology, and economic life. It 
is the crucial input to the growth of human knowledge. At the same time, novelty is one of 
the most amorphous concepts in scientific thought. Theorizing about novelty and its 
emergence faces notorious problems. This paper explores why this is so and what can be 
done to deal in a more systematic fashion with novelty. The notion of degrees of novelty is 
introduced, and its relationship with the concept of uncertainty is discussed. The results of the 
inquiry are summarized by a number of hypotheses.
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I. Introduction  
The emergence of novelty is a pervasive feature of modern life and an important driver of economic 
development. New ideas, practices, and artefacts transform culture, commerce, and technology. When 
considering options to innovate, every businessman is contemplating, and often trying out, new 
speculations, beliefs, and know-how. More broadly seen, in nature too, the emergence of genetic and 
epigenetic novelty is a driving agent of evolution. Both in nature and the sphere of human action, 
novelty adds to already existing variety and fuels the competitive transformation processes with 
manifest consequences. In the economy, the continuing creation of novelty feeds the growth of useful 
(problem-solving) knowledge that, in turn, has been the mainstay of the soaring economic growth of 
the past few centuries. 
Despite the importance of emerging novelty as an agent of change, a comprehensive, 
structured theory of novelty does not exist, and it does not even seem clear whether such a theory is 
feasible at all. The complexity of the act from which novelty emerges and its epistemic peculiarity  
(the fact that the informational content of novelty cannot be anticipated) make novelty a difficult 
research topic. Some insights that are relevant for the mental production of novelty can be found in 
the vast literature on human creativity (see, e.g., Sternberg 1999), cognitive science (e.g., in the work 
on problem solving, see Newell and Simon 1972), and the formation of cognitive concepts (Finke et 
al. 1992, Hofstadter et al. 1995, Fauconnier and Turner 2002). There have even been some first 
attempts at dealing with novelty analytically (e.g., in Zabell 1992). In contrast, with the exception of 
historical studies of the emergence of man-made novelty in technology and production (e.g., Usher 
1954, Vincenti 1990, Mokyr 1990), in economics the emergence of novelty is usually treated as an 
exogenous shock. If novelty is considered at all, the focus is on its diffusion in an industry or the 
economy.
In this paper, the emergence of novelty will therefore be put at center stage. What the 
Page 3 of 29
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
-3-
processes that lead to novelty emergence look like and what kind of hypotheses are possible ex ante
about their outcome (i.e. about the emerging informational content) will be explored. The paper 
proceeds as follows. Section II clarifies some conceptual ambiguities that often hamper the discussion 
about novelty. Section III introduces a procedural approach to novelty that distinguishes between a 
generative operation and an interpretative operation that are involved in the emergence of novelty. 
These two operations are shown to be logically independent of each other and to have profoundly 
differing implications. In the light of the procedural approach suggested, Section IV discusses the 
epistemic peculiarities in the creation of novelty, the logical structure of the interpretative operation, 
and the conclusions to be drawn regarding the role that novelty plays for the evolution of human 
knowledge. Section V elaborates on the observation that, in retrospect, it makes a difference whether 
novelty means only a minor variation in known details or an entirely new thought that eludes existing 
frameworks. The notion of degrees of novelty is introduced and is compared with the concepts of 
degrees of likelihood or belief. Section VI offers the conclusions. 
II. Some Prolegomena
When an attempt is made in this paper to explore the possibilities for and some features of a theory of 
novelty and its emergence, one problem that must be faced is the ambiguity of the term “novelty”. 
Usually, what is meant can be captured as follows:
Definition Novelty is something that was unknown before a particular point in time and that, 
hence, was discovered or created at that point in time. 
Some qualifications are, however, necessary. Novelty is defined here relative to existing propositional 
or procedural knowledge on facts, rules, or theories. This relationship implies several contingencies. 
What is not known in one domain j up to a time tj can already have become known in a different 
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domain i at a time ti < tj. It is thus new only to the specific domain j. Therefore, it is necessary to 
distinguish between something novel to a specific domain and something that is universally novel. 
Universal novelty emerges somewhere at a time τ, so that there is no domain i for which ti < τ. 
The distinctive epistemological feature of novelty is expressed by the difference it makes 
when the ex ante view of what is novel (i.e. the view at a time t < τ) is compared to the view one can 
take ex post (i.e. at time t  τ ). Unlike in the ex ante case, ex post a (fictitious) observer is able, and 
typically is assumed, to know the relevant properties and meaning of what has emerged or is being 
created. However, what has become known in this way is no longer “novelty” in the epistemic sense. 
It is an ordinary piece of information labeled “novel” only in a retrospective sense. Depending on 
which perspective is taken, theorizing about novelty thus amounts to either pre-revelation or post-
revelation analysis, two epistemologically fundamentally different approaches (Witt 1993). One of the 
consequences of the epistemic limitations that are binding up to time τ is the predictive weakness of 
scientific disciplines in whose domains novelty is regularly generated in the course of events,
economics being a case in point.
As far as anthropogenic novelty is concerned, its origin can be exogenously triggered new 
sensory perceptions (and their mental representation) or the endogenous formation of new thought. 
Discovering, for example, the flavor of a not-yet-tasted fruit certainly satisfies the above definition of 
novelty. However, this may, but does not have to, involve a creative act of the mind, something that, 
in contrast, is always the case when new thought is formed. This distinction is relevant for clarifying 
the relationship between discovery and invention. Discovery can, but does not necessarily, involve a 
creative act. Invention, in contrast, always presupposes the creation of some new thought that 
materializes in the form of new artefact and/or practice. On the one side there are thus some 
discoveries that do not involve a creative act while, on the other side, there are both discoveries and 
inventions that do. 
New ideas, beliefs, and know-how induce the agents to develop new behaviors, strategies, 
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practices, and artefacts (“innovations”). The differences between domain-specific and universal 
novelty turns up here again in the guise of subjective vs. objective novelty (Machlup 1980, chap. 8,
Witt 1993, in Boden 1999 as historic vs. psychological novelty). Subjective novelty is something that 
is new for a particular agent k who gets to know it at time tk. Being new relative to k’s knowledge 
domain does not exclude the possibility that its meaning is already known to some other agent(s),for 
example, a scientific observer h, if  τ    th  <  tk. Already knowing what is going to be revealed to 
other individuals later provides a basis for conjecturing about their likely reactions when they become 
aware of the particular novelty. This is indeed the epistemic position regularly adopted in research on 
the diffusion of innovations (see Rogers 1995), the arena of post-revelation analysis. In the case of 
objective, that is, universal, novelty (the arena of pre-revelation analysis), this epistemic position is 
not possible.
III. The Procedural Approach: Operations by Which Novelty Is Being Created 
What can be said more precisely about how new ideas, beliefs, and knowledge emerge, given that, as 
Shackle (1973, p. 26) noted, such statements cannot be logically deduced from already existing ideas, 
beliefs, and knowledge? What is the logical relationship between already existing thought and new 
thought established by the creative act? In his inquiry into the emergence of cognitive novelty, 
Koestler (1964, p. 120) claims that “the creative act ... does not create something out of nothing; it 
uncovers, selects, re-shuffles, combines, synthesizes already existing facts, ideas, faculties, skills”. By 
a more or less accidental displacement of attention to something not previously noted, new elements
are introduced into a given context with which they have not been previously associated.
The idea that novelty can emerge from cross-over or, more generally, (re-) combination of 
existing elements (including combination with omissions), is not a new one, but it needs some 
qualifications. An arbitrary (re-) combination of something with something else is rarely what leads to 
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new ideas or imaginings. 1 A cognitive concept carries meaning only in relation to some context. To 
combine concepts in an accidental way therefore usually means mixing up contexts that are foreign to 
one another. New meaning can only be induced if there is a chance of aligning the different contexts 
(Gentner and Markman 1997). However, even if the contextual constraint of some similarity between 
the things to be (re-) combined is met, the subsequent reshuffling does not by itself lend a new 
meaning to the resulting combinations. For this to be accomplished, a meaningful association between 
them must be induced, be it a “conceptual integration” based on the common elements or features or a 
categorical reduction by which commonalities are induced via a memorized more general category 
(Finke et al. 1992, Chap. 2 and 5, Fauconnier and Turner 2002, Chap.3). 
                                                     
     1 Jonathan Swift (1934, p. 172, reprint of 1st edition of 1726) parodied the absurdity of such a 
notion nicely in Section III of Gulliver’s Travels, “A Voyage to Laputa,” with a mechanical 
reshuffling of words. The protagonist Gulliver visits the academy of science, meeting the “projector 
of speculative learning” who shows him
“ .... a Frame, about the Sides whereof all his Pupils stood in Ranks. It was Twenty 
Foot square. The Superficies was composed of several Bits of Wood, about the 
Bigness of a Dye, but some larger than others. They were all linked together by 
slender Wires. These Bits of Wood were covered on every Square with Papers pasted 
on them; and on these Papers were written all the Words of their Language ...without 
any Order. The Professor then desired me to observe, for he was going to set his 
Engine at work. The Pupils at his Command took each of them hold of an Iron 
Handle, whereof there were Forty fixed round the Edges of the Frame; and giving 
them a sudden Turn, the whole Disposition of Words was entirely changed. He then 
commanded Six and Thirty of the Lads to read the several Lines softly as they 
appeared upon the frame; and where they found three or four Words together that 
might make Part of the Sentence, they dictated to the four remaining Boys...” (Swift 
1934, p. 172, reprint of 1st edition of 1726)
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At a closer look it thus appears that a qualified reshuffling of existing elements is one thing. 
Finding sense in the resulting combinations, if there is any, for example, aligning the multiple 
contexts that have been mingled, is something else. From a procedural point of view on what happens 
when novelty emerges, one may thus conclude
Hypothesis 1 The creation of new cognitive concepts (ideas, imaginings) involves two operations. 
One is a generative operation that produces new (re-) combinations of elements. The 
other is an interpretative operation by which the new (re-) combination is integrated 
into a newly emerging or a more general already existing concept.
Even though they coincide in time, the two operations are logically distinct. How they work and 
interact can be illustrated by a simple example of a conceptual integration. 
Economic activities can sometimes be described by simple factual statements such as, “agent 
X sells commodity Y”. In a semantic representation, the cognitive concepts involved are depicted by 
subject S, predicate P, and object O in the corresponding basic sentence. (Using a semantic 
representation has some advantages. First, the criteria constraining the generative operation can easily 
be identified. Second, at the semantic level, it is possible to grasp intuitively the similarity of 
cognitive concepts and the meaning that emerges in the act of conceptual integration.) Consider the 
following simple statements
(i-a) “kiosks (S1) sell (Pa) convenience goods (O1a)” 
and 
(i-b) “kiosks (S1) have (Pb) extended business hours (Ob)”.
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Statements like these, sharing the same subject (“kiosks”), are simple propositional networks 
by which contextual knowledge or beliefs about the subject are encoded (Anderson 2000, chap. 5). 
Imagine a test person who is asked to write down what she associates with “kiosk” (i.e. retrieves from 
her memory as the relevant context). The results typically are statements such as (i-a) and (i-b). Let us 
denote the structure of the corresponding propositional network by
Pa  O1a
(1) S1
Pb  Ob . 
Now suppose that the test person is given the cognitive concept “gas station” (S2), and that 
she associates the following statements:
(ii-a) “gas stations (S2) sell (Pa) gas (O2a)” 
and 
(ii-b) “gas stations (S2) have (Pb) extended business hours (Ob)”. 
Page 9 of 29
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
-9-
The corresponding propositional network can be denoted by
Pa  O2a
(2) S2
Pb  Ob .
The propositional networks (1) and (2) have Pa, Pb, and Ob in common. To avoid nonsensical 
statements that would result from an arbitrary reshuffling of subjects, predicates, and objects (as in 
Swift’s parody), the commonalities can be used as a basis for cross-overs or recombinations. The 
generative operation is then subjected to the constraint of retaining the syntactic order. This means 
that, in the recombination, precisely the non-common elements (set in italics) are crossed over as 
shown by  the scheme in (3). 
S1
Pa O1a
(3)
S2 Pa O2a, 
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For the two statements thus generated, the question is whether, in the new combination, the 
original contexts can be aligned so that a new meaning is induced. This question is answered by the 
interpretative operation. In the present case, the original contexts are so similar that they suggest a 
combinatory extension of the original factual statements (i-a) and (ii-a) into
(i-c)  “kiosks sell convenience goods and gas”
(ii-c) “gas stations sell gas and convenience goods”. 2
The combinatory extensions (i-c) and (ii-c) evoke the interpretation of a possible extension of the 
business strategies of kiosks and gas stations respectively. Despite the extremely simple structure of 
the propositional networks used in the generative operation, when interpreted as a combinatory 
extension, its outcome yields meaningful new concepts. In the 1960s this extension was indeed an 
innovation strategy in the services industry. In the U.S., convenience store chains such as “7-eleven” 
started adding gas to their assortment of products and services. About a decade later, gas stations in 
Europe started to sell convenience goods in addition to gas to take advantage of their extended 
business hours. 
                                                     
     2 An equivalent result can be derived if the statements (i-a) and (ii-a) are interpreted as 
definitions of the form “kiosks are businesses that sell convenience goods” and “gas stations are 
businesses that sell gas”. A mere recombinant exchange of O1a and O2a would result in a violation of 
these definitions. Only by expanding the definitions of kiosks and gas stations in the form of the 
combinatory extension do the new, conceptually integrated definitions “kiosks are businesses that sell 
convenience goods and gas” and “gas stations are businesses that sell gas and convenience goods” 
emerge.
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IV. Some Implications of the Procedural Approach to Novelty
The example in the previous section served to highlight the different functions of the generative and 
the interpretative operation. Due to the simple structure of the factual statements in the example, both 
the generative operation and the combinatory extensions identified by the interpretative operation are 
rather special. They can easily be extended to explain the use of metaphors and analogies by which 
the acts of recombining and conceptual integration in creating novelty are often systematized (see, 
e.g., the work on concept formation by Nersessian 2002). In other cases, the associative basis for 
attributing new meaning may, of course, require a more complex semantic representation and/or logic, 
such as, when meaning is induced by categorical reduction and generic abstraction. Furthermore, 
before a conceptual integration succeeds, several iterations may often be necessary in which the 
conceptual inputs to the generative operation are modified or replaced over and over again (Finke et 
al. 1992, Chap.2). In addition, if objects other than semantically represented ones are involved, the 
two operations may have to be suitably adjusted. However, these reservations notwithstanding, both 
the generative operation and the interpretative operation are generic to the creation of mental novelty. 
Their exemplary discussion can therefore be used to derive some more general insights about novelty 
and its emergence that will be discussed now. 
A first inference that can be made relates to the generative operation. With reference to 
Campbell (1960), the adherents of an evolutionary epistemology often claim that novelty emerges 
from “blind” variation (see, e.g., Hodgson and Knudsen 2006). Blindness here means that the 
contextual constraints on the (re-) combination process discussed above are not binding. Any 
arbitrarily chosen sets such as, for example, the English vocabulary and the data set of daily Dow-
Jones stock exchange indices from 1950 - 2000 could be commingled irrespective of whether or not 
there is some commonality on the basis of which the disparate elements could be conceptually 
integrated. Furthermore, in choosing which elements of the sets are to be (re-) combined, blind 
variation would also mean ignoring the internal structure of the sets such as, for example, the 
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syntactic structure of the propositional networks in scheme (3) above. 
However, even in genetics, the model for evolutionary epistemology, variation is not blind 
(not even in the case of mutations which are, after all, local copying errors in DNA strings). In sexual 
reproduction, for instance, the lion’s share of variation results from the recombination of parental 
genes. This is subject to strict matching rules for the nucleotide chains in the breakage and reunion of 
homologous chromosomes, a biochemical form of rigid contextuality. Even in the analogously 
modeled genetic algorithms, the crossing over is confined to elements or sections of binary coded 
strings, and it exchanges only equivalently formatted sections. The following may therefore be 
inferred:
Hypothesis 2 The generative operation is based on a contextual pre-selection of sets and elements 
of sets to be recombined that follows some similarity or conformity criterion.
Because of the similarity and conformity criteria underlying the choice of what is (re-) combined, the 
generative operation is a more or less strongly guided process and, hence, is far from a “blind” 
variation.
A further conclusion concerns the interpretative operation and a significant feature in which it 
differs from the generative operation. Unlike the generative operation with its plain logic, the 
associative act by which the human mind accomplishes a conceptual integration in the interpretative 
operation is not fully understood.3 In discussing examples of the associative act such as the one above, 
                                                     
     3 To say nothing of the underlying neural processes (cf. Koch and Crick 2000, Edelman and 
Tononi 2000, Chap. 10).  Johnson-Laird (2005) considers the associative act as something that is 
outside the scope of current psychological theories and their computer implementations. It has been 
conjectured, however, that the associative act is a search process in an extremely high dimensional 
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the unresolved problem of how exactly the conceptual integration comes about is by-passed by letting 
our intuition doing the trick. In view of this it is important that, by Hypothesis 1, the generative 
operation and the interpretative operation are logically distinct and, hence, can be carried out 
separately from one another. From this follows
Hypothesis 3 While the generative operation can be automatized mechanically or electronically 
outside the human mind, for example, by numerical algorithms and programs, the 
carrying out of the interpretative operation is bound to the medium of the human 
mind and can therefore not be automatized.
A remark is necessary here. The generative and the interpretative operations are given a 
constitutive role in the creation of mental novelty. This does not necessarily mean that these two 
operations are also sufficient for the creative act. Yet another operation can often be observed to 
accompany the interpretative operation, namely an evaluative one. However, where the interpretative 
operation answers the question of what it is that emerges, the evaluative operation is concerned with 
what the utility, advantage, benefit of this is. Even if coinciding with the interpretative operation, the 
act of evaluating the novel outcome is therefore logically distinct and, from the procedural point of 
view, not necessary for novelty to be created. On the other hand, where novelty creation is an iterated 
process, a concomitant evaluative operation can feed back on the generative operation. This happens 
if the criteria on which, according to Hypothesis 2, the pre-selection of sets and elements involved in 
the generative operation is made contingent on how the preceding outcomes of the interpretative 
                                                                                                                                                                    
memory space (cf. Kohonen 1987). By searching the space, connections are traced to cognitive 
concepts that have been laid out by earlier experience. These concepts can be imagined to be sampled 
with a probability that depends on how closely they appear to be connected to the new concept under 
consideration, yet thus far it has not been possible to derive the measure of coherence that is required 
to determine the “closeness” of concepts.
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operation are evaluated. Though not itself involved in the creation of novelty, an evaluative operation 
can in this way influence what novelty emerges. 
The fact that an evaluative operation is logically distinct from the interpretative operation 
makes it possible to carry this out outside the human mind and to automatize it. Recently, steps in that 
direction have indeed been taken by modeling the feedback of the evaluative operation on the 
generative operation by way of an analogy to natural selection in genetic or, more generally, evolution 
algorithms (see Holland 1992, Bäck 1996). In nature, the generative operation is the recombination of 
specifically selected genetic material. The equivalent to the interpretative operation is the epigenetic 
expression of the varied gene code in the development of the phenotype. The evaluation is indirectly 
produced at an extra-somatic level by the competition for reproductive success between the different 
phenotypes that develop from the population’s gene pool. The systematic feedback between the 
adaptive value of the traits of the phenotypes (evaluation) and the selective admission of their genes to 
the recombination (generative operation) in the next generation is called natural selection.
Analogously, in genetic algorithms, elements or segments of binary strings are recombined in 
a computer-based generative operation. If not skipped altogether, the interpretative operation is 
degenerated into pre-specified mapping instructions written into the computer program. The resulting 
“new” variant is launched into a simulated environment where it is subjected to an evaluative 
operation that measures the performance relative to that of competing variants produced in the same 
way. If better performing variants are used more frequently or exclusively for recombination in a next 
round of the simulated generative operation, this can shape the kind of novelty that emerges in the 
simulation over time.
By recognizing the role of such complex numerically iterated dynamics systems in generating 
novelty, yet another conclusion can be drawn. Assume that the algorithm of the generative operation 
is known and that it does not produce a chaotic time series. In addition, let the interpretative and/or 
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evaluative operations be pre-specified. If it is nonetheless not possible to deduce the implications 
logically from the premises, this is usually because of the complexity of the recursive relation 
between the generative, interpretative, and evaluative operations. Novelty in the sense of not 
previously known implications can then be discovered (rather than created) by the human 
experimenter through numerical simulations. Hence, the process of revealing novelty by simulating 
complex recursive programs and the creative act of the human mind have something in common. The 
commonality is a key to understanding the peculiar epistemic features of novelty. 
Hypothesis 4 Novelty is revealed through inductive operations whose outcome, by definition, 
cannot be derived from the premises. Carrying out the inductive operations requires 
time, and thus prevents the meaning of novelty being instantaneously accessible. 
The inductive nature of the simulations discussed is obvious. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
creation of novelty in the human mind is not fully understood, the inductive nature of the associative 
act underlying conceptual integration, categorical reduction, or generic abstraction seems equally 
obvious. Moreover, it has been argued that the interpretative operation is inaccessible to deductive 
reasoning on grounds of principle (see Markose 2004 and 2005 referring to Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem). The generative operation requires inductive methods whenever it is chaotic (which can even 
be the case for simple recombination dynamics; see Prigogine 1993) or too complex to be solved 
analytically. Note that the time constraint stated in Hypothesis 4 still holds even if someday it would 
be possible to automatize the interpretative operation in a non-trivial way outside the human mind.
A final inference that can be drawn from the approach taken here concerns the role that 
novelty plays for the evolution of human thought and knowledge. In the example in the previous 
section, the meaning of the  elements (the cognitive concepts in the propositional networks) from 
which the combinatory extension emerged were all known beforehand. Moreover, it seems likely that 
the primitive concepts (“gas station”, “kiosk”) themselves emerged through conceptual integration 
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from other, still more primitive cognitive concepts. It can therefore be conjectured that the emergence 
of novelty is not only a process that is iterated over and over again, but that it is also a cumulative, 
potentially autocatalytic process. This suggests
Hypothesis 5 By re-using newly created concepts in further iterations of the generative operation, 
an infinitely growing number of concepts can emerge from a finite number of initial 
elements, provided that the share of combinations to which a new meaning can be 
attributed is non-vanishing. 
In the light of Hypothesis 5, the evolution of human thought appears to be the creation of 
increasingly more complex chains of concepts composed of an ever larger set of known elements. 
(What carries novelty are, in each case, the recombined elements that did not previously exit.) This 
fact is hidden only by the complexity-reducing habit of denoting longer chains, or parts of them, with 
own shorthand terms. For example, instead of using the combinatory extension (ii-c) “gas stations 
selling gas and convenience goods”, a shorthand has already emerged, calling the new hybrid a 
“supercenter”. In this example, Hypothesis 5 would thus presuppose that “supercenter” can be entered 
into the formation of new propositional networks, perhaps as subject or object, without any of the now 
three concepts “kiosks”, “gas stations”, and “supercenter” being a substitute for any other.
If Hypothesis 5 is correct, it follows by backward induction that at the beginning of the chain 
of cumulative novelty creation, there must have been some ultimate prior concepts that were 
themselves not cognitively created. To put it differently, the cumulative process must have started 
from some innate concepts, a conclusion that accords with the “embodied knowledge” hypothesis (cf. 
Hayek 1952 for an early discussion). 
The conjecture of an autocatalytic expansion of the number of concepts in human thought (i.e. 
of an expansion that, driven by a growth-of-base effect, fuels itself) is in agreement with the 
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observable accumulation of the human knowledge. At the symbolic level of the alphabet, the novelty-
by-extension phenomenon finds its equivalent in the ever-longer strings of letters by which the 
expanding body of thought (the “library of human thought” that has been growing since the invention 
of writing) is documented. However, given that it is not known what exactly happens in the 
interpretative operation, it is hard to assess what chances there are for the condition to hold that the 
share of combinations to which a new meaning can be attributed is indeed non-vanishing. 
Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that, because of both memory and communication constraints, it is 
increasingly more difficult to make the ever growing body of concepts available for further (re-) 
combinations.4
V. Degrees of Novelty and Uncertainty
Novelty has been defined here as something that was unknown before a particular point in time and 
that, hence, was discovered or created at that point in time. However, whether a particular novelty is 
only a more or less minor detail of something that is otherwise well known or whether it is altogether 
new seems to make a big difference. The invention of a new ignition device like the sparking plug, for 
instance, created a new and more reliable way of running a combustion engine, but in retrospect, this 
seems to be a less significant novelty than the invention of the combustion engine itself. Observations 
such as these give rise to the conjecture that there are degrees of novelty that can differ from case to 
case. In fact, such an ex post distinction between degrees of novelty is often made in innovation 
                                                     
     4 For a discussion of the economic implications of an auto-catalytic growth of economically 
useful knowledge see Weitzman (1998). For scientific knowledge it has been claimed that there is 
evidence for a fading auto-catalytic growth of knowledge primarily because there is a declining share 
of significant new results from search and experimentation; see de Solla Price (1963) and Rescher 
(1989). 
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research, for example, by contrasting basic innovations with follow-up innovations. 5 The question is 
whether different degrees of novelty can also be distinguished ex ante. Such differences correlate with 
the uncertainty surrounding an upcoming novelty. The higher the degree of novelty, the more novelty-
induced uncertainty seems to loom. To determine the extent of novelty-induced uncertainty, it would 
therefore be desirable to have a measure for the ex ante degree of novelty.
In a procedural approach to novelty it is straightforward to try to derive differences in the 
degree of novelty from constraints that can be imposed on the generative and/or interpretative 
operation on a priori grounds. An example of such constraints was given above with the contextual 
constraints relevant for the combinatory extensions (i-c) and (ii-c). Indeed, if the generative operation 
and its outcomes are known, those combinations that cannot be generated by that operation can be 
excluded from the subsequent interpretative operation, thus reducing substantially the input set on 
which it is based.
A simple example is an urn with 49 balls numbered from 1 to 49 and a mechanical device by 
which 6 balls are drawn from that urn at random in an unbiased way without replacement and without 
observing the order of the drawings. (This is the basis of a popular weekly bet offered by the state 
lottery in some European countries.) In this example, no outcome other than a combination of six 
different integers between 1 and 49 can ever be generated. To give another example, imagine a unit 
box that is subjected to the “baker transformation” (Prigogine 1993). This means that the box is 
squashed to half its height and double its length, cut in the middle, and re-composed by putting the 
                                                     
     5 See the examples in Silverberg and Verspagen (2003). The distinction can be traced back to 
Schumpeter (1934, pp. 64-66) who stresses in his theory of entrepreneurial innovations the role of 
novelty that discontinues previous lines of technological and organizational development. The deeper 
issue here are the gradualist vs. saltationalist theories of evolution (see Rosser 1992 for a discussion) 
that implicitly presuppose a distinction of different degrees of novelty.
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cut-off right half on top of the left. The outcome of the transformation is the spatial relocation of the 
coordinates of all points in the unit box by a deterministic rule, yet the future coordinates of any two 
initially chosen points disappear quickly from sight, the further ahead an iteration of the 
transformation is. All that can (trivially) be excluded in this example is that no point will ever fall 
outside the unit box.
Regarding the interpretative operation, the fact that it is not fully understood makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to impose ex ante constraints on it or its outcome. What can often be 
observed, but should not be confused with the desirable constraints, is that criteria are invoked ex ante 
by which the outcome of the interpretative operation is to be assessed ex post. For example, for a 
given technical or economic problem, some desirable features of its unknown solution may be 
specified in advance. The novelty resulting from the subsequent creative search process may then be 
assessed ex post as to whether it represents a solution to the problem with the desired features. 
The deviation of actually emerging novelty from the expectations formed before may  ex post
be taken as a measure of subjective surprise. It is clear, though, that such an ex post assessment of 
surprise cannot have any bearing on an ex ante degree of novelty, nor can an ex ante assessment of 
“potential surprise” have any bearing. The cardinal measure of potential surprise was suggested by 
Shackle (1949) as an alternative for deriving subjective probabilities. It rates events that are ex ante
imagined (and hence anti ipated) by a decision maker according to how surprising their later 
occurrence would subjectively be felt by the decision maker. In contrast, novelty is something that, by 
definition, is not anticipated.  6
                                                     
     6 A striking example is the “Arcanum” story (Gleeson 1999). In 1703 the German alchemist 
Johann Friedrich Boettger was imprisoned by August the Strong of Saxonia, because it was believed 
that he would be able to synthesize gold. A laboratory was set up for him at the fortress in Meissen. 
He probed and sifted there using several processes and materials, but instead of finding a recipe for 
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It seems, thus, that the interpretative operation is either non-trivial, so that no constraint can 
ex ante be imposed on the operation and its outcomes,7  or it is a trivial operation in the sense that the 
meaning of all possible outcomes is already known beforehand. This is, in particular, the case when 
the generative operation implies a binding interpretation for all its outcomes as in the examples of the 
(stochastic) lottery and the (deterministic) baker transformation. No associative act is needed anymore 
for making sense of the results. In view of this condition, the conclusion that can be derived from the 
feasible ex ante constraints is rather weak. 
Hypothesis 6 The ex ante degree of novelty is minimal (but not necessarily zero) if the generative 
operation is known and the interpretative operation is trivial in the sense that the 
meaning of all its possible outcomes is known beforehand. The degree of novelty is 
maximal where the generative operation is not known and no constraint can be 
imposed on the outcome of the interpretative operation. 
Turning to the relationship between the degree of novelty and uncertainty, two questions can 
                                                                                                                                                                    
making gold, six years later he invented a way to make white porcelain. A non-anticipated outcome 
like this (it is actually a case of a domain-specific novelty as, unknown to the western world, the way 
to make white porcelain had been known in China since ancient times) cannot be made part of an ex 
ante rating of potential surprise.
     7 Note that even an apparently trivial constraint like that of logical truth is not binding here. 
The construction of an erroneous mathematical proof may be as much novelty as the construction of a 
logically true one. The same holds for the validity of an empirical conjecture created by inductive
inference; it is new independent of whether or not it can be confirmed. This is indeed the very basis 
for running science as a process of conjectures and refutations.
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be posed. First, while the limiting case of a maximal degree of novelty is obviously associated with a 
state of complete (novelty-induced) uncertainty about what is going to be created, what is the nature 
of novelty-induced uncertainty in the other limiting case? Second, and following-up an answer to this 
question, what can be said about the degree of novelty, or novelty-induced uncertainty, in the range 
between the two extremes? 
In the case of a minimal degree of novelty, to start with that question, there is still something 
not known ex ante. Consider the lottery example. Assuming that the true bias status of the drawing 
device is known, all possible outcomes of a future run can be anticipated. However, because it is 
generated by a random mechanism, what is not yet known is the particular subset of integers drawn at 
a certain date or iteration in the future. However, precisely because all possible outcomes and the 
nature of the sampling mechanism are known, there is a basis for deriving probabilities. Lacking 
evidence to the contrary, all possible outcomes can be treated as equally probable so that degrees of 
likelihood of, or belief in, all possible outcomes can be constructed as a cardinal measure of 
uncertainty in the probabilistic sense.
More generally speaking, the feature that is still unknown in a state where the degree of 
novelty is minimal is exactly the object on which probability theory focuses when arguing that 
something is not yet known with certainty. An instance indicative of this constellation is Zabell’s 
(1992) attempt at “predicting the unpredictable”. Zabell explores the emergence of novelty under the 
assumption that the emergence is a serial phenomenon. His example is the emergence of a new 
species. A finite number of organisms already exist. They are classified into different species. New 
organisms are continually added. They can either represent an already known species or a new one 
(the so-called “sampling of species problem”). Zabell is able to derive the probability for the event 
that a newly added organism represents a new species. In terms of the present approach, what Zabell 
predicts has a minimal degree of novelty. As in the case of the lottery, all possible outcomes of the 
generative operation can be anticipated. The interpretative operation is trivial, adding no new meaning 
to any of the two possible outcomes. What is not known with certainty is whether or not the next 
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living organism added will indeed increase the number of existing species by 1. 
Regarding the second question above, it can be more specifically asked now whether the 
reduction of novelty-induced uncertainty to uncertainty in the probabilistic sense is also possible for a 
degree of novelty in the range between minimal and the maximal ones. By Hypothesis 6, the degree of 
novelty is greater than minimal, but less than maximal, if one of the following conditions holds. Either 
the outcome of the interpretative operation is non-trivial, but possible outcomes of the generative 
operation are known ex ante, or the outcome of the interpretative operation is trivial, but the outcome 
of the generative operation cannot be anticipated. 
Consider the first condition. Since the meaning of what comes out of the interpretative 
operation is not known beforehand, the information available ex ante is no longer sufficient to specify 
the state space required for constructing a probability measure. Zabell’s “sampling of species 
problem” can be used to illustrate the difference. The outcome of the interpretative operation would 
not be trivial (and, hence, the ex ante degree of novelty is greater than minimal) if, instead of 
predicting the mere occurrence of a new species, the problem were to predict the properties of the 
new species. However, in contrast to Zabell’s probability model in which the state space can 
recursively be determined by adding a further organism of either an already existing species or a new 
one, the state space would now have to be made dependent on the number of different properties of 
the new species, something not yet known.8
                                                     
     8 When such information is lacking, probability theory traditionally resorts to the notion of 
equi-probability or equi-possibility to compensate for the information deficit (see Hacking 1975, 
Chap. 14). However, these notions cannot be extended to an as yet unknown number of cases or 
variants, except in the trivial sense that everything is possible, see Shackle (1973, Chap.1) and his 
"residual hypothesis" verdict.
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Now consider the case where the interpretative operation is trivial, but the outcome of the 
generative operation cannot be anticipated. Again, there is no basis for specifying the state space 
required for a probability model. An instructive example is the process resulting from Prigogine’s 
iterated baker transformation. Whatever the transformation generates, its interpretation is indeed 
known beforehand: it will always be the coordinates of two points in the unit box. In fact, even the 
generative operation is clearly defined by the deterministic relocation rule. Nonetheless, in many 
cases, the position which two initially chosen points subsequently take can no longer be anticipated 
for iterations further ahead into the future.9 The outcome needs to be induced by carrying out the 
                                                     
     9 It is sufficient here to demonstrate this for the horizontal distance d, 0 < d  1, between the 
two points (cp. Prigogine 1993). d is multiplied by a “factor 2 modulo 1” transforming d into 

2d, if 0 < 2d    1
d     =
2d - 1, if 2  > 1.
Any value that d can take can be represented as the sum of some elements of the geometric series 2-n , 
n = 0, 1, 2,... Mark the position of each of the elements in the geometric series that sum up to d with 1 
and all other positions up to the smallest element of the sum with 0. This results in a binary string of 
varying length. Each iteration of the baker transformation can then be expressed in terms of a 
Bernoulli shift (i.e. a shift by which the zeros and ones of the binary string are moved by one position)
to the left. Now let d = 2 - 1. In this case, the number of elements in the geometric series required to 
represent this value, and hence the corresponding binary string, are infinite. It is not possible, 
therefore, to derive the evolution of d by extrapolation of the Bernoulli shift. This is a simple case of a 
chaotic time series in which novelty can emerge (cp. also Smale's 1967 "horseshoe" model).
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generative operation over and over again. 
For the relationships between the concept of novelty-induced uncertainty on the one hand and 
the probabilistic concept of uncertainty on the other, it follows from these considerations:
Hypothesis 7 Novelty-induced uncertainty reduces to uncertainty in the probabilistic sense 
measured by the degree of likelihood or belief if, and only if, the degree of novelty is 
minimal. In the limiting case of a degree of novelty equal to zero, known outcomes 
occur with probability 1(certainty).
On a priori grounds our knowledge does not suffice to weigh how lacking information about 
the generative operation impacts the degree of novelty compared to the impact of a lack of 
information about the interpretative operation. A comparative assessment of the number, relevance, 
and/or conditionality of possible constraints on the two operations is not feasible. For this reasons 
there is no possibility of deriving a consistent ranking for the ex ante degree of novelty between the 
minimal and the maximal degrees, not to speak of a cardinal measure. Consequently, what our 
knowledge allows is only the weakest possible ordering (cp. Keynes 1921, Chap. II).
Hypothesis 8 The ex ante degree of novelty (and, hence, novelty-induced uncertainty) can, on a 
priori grounds, be determined as being maximal, less than maximal but greater than 
minimal, or minimal (with limiting case of a zero degree of novelty).
Because of its peculiar epistemological status, novelty-induced uncertainty is a much less structured 
concept than uncertainty in the probabilistic sense.10
                                                     
     10 If a distinction between risk and uncertainty as in Knight (1921, Chap. VII) is made, novelty-
induced uncertainty is a case of Knightian uncertainty.
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VI. Conclusions
Why is it so difficult to work with the notion of novelty? How does novelty emerge? Are there 
different degrees of novelty, and if so, how do they relate to the concepts of uncertainty? In this paper 
an attempt has been made to answer these questions. Novelty was defined as something that was 
unknown before a particular point in time and that, hence, was discovered or created at that point in 
time. It was argued that novelty emerges from two logically distinct operations, a generative one and 
an interpretative one. To take advantage of our capacity to grasp the meaning of novelty intuitively, a 
semantic representation of novelty was chosen to explain this in more detail. The generative operation 
was shown to (re-) combine conceptual inputs given here in the form of propositional networks. With 
respect to the interpretative operation, it had to be acknowledged that the way in which meaning (if 
any) is attributed in a conceptual integration to the newly generated combinations is not yet 
understood and that it therefore cannot be carried out outside the human mind. Nonetheless, the 
insights into the generative and the interpretative operations that are feasible allow some conclusion to 
be drawn.
One of the conclusions is that the peculiar epistemic status of novelty is caused by the 
inductive nature of the operations from which it emerges. These operations need to be carried out in 
real time before any novelty can be revealed. Another conclusion is that, by the very operation by 
which they are generated, all newly created cognitive concepts are made up of elements that have 
previously been known. Since newly created concepts can be used, in turn, as inputs for iterating the 
generative operation, ever more extended compositions of known elements evolve. Starting from 
conceptual input sets with a finite number of elements, an infinite number of new concepts can be 
created. The expansion of human thought is thus a cumulative process that feeds itself. 
Since it seems to make a big difference whether a particular novelty is only a minor variation 
of something already known or whether it is altogether new, the paper also discussed the possibility of 
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distinguishing between different degrees of novelty ex ante. Differences in this degree correlate with 
the uncertainty surrounding an upcoming novelty. In the procedural approach to novelty that was 
chosen in this paper, differences in the degree of novelty are likely to result from constraints that can 
be imposed on the generative and/or interpretative operations on a priori grounds. Such constraints 
were shown to relate to how much is known about the properties of the two operations and their 
possible outcomes. 
Accordingly, the degree of novelty and, hence, the uncertainty surrounding an up-coming 
novelty were argued to be maximal where the generative operation is not known and no constraint can 
be imposed on the outcomes of the interpretative operation. It could be demonstrated that, at the other 
end of the range, the ex ante degree of novelty is minimal, but not necessarily zero, if the outcomes of 
the generative operation and the meaning of all possible outcomes of the interpretative operation are 
known beforehand. There may then still be features of up-coming novelty that are not known with 
certainty, but for these it is possible to derive degrees of likelihood. Hence, novelty-induced 
uncertainty in this special case reduces to uncertainty in the probabilistic sense. For degrees of novelty 
between the two extremes, novelty-induced uncertainty cannot be reduced to uncertainty in the 
probabilistic sense, nor can, for epistemological reasons, an ordinal or even cardinal measure of the 
degree of novelty be established. 
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